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Volume 42 Summer 1977 Number 3
ESCAPING THE TYRANNY OF
COMMON LAW ESTATES
RONALD MAUDSLEY*
The complexities of the law of future interests are not wholly due to
the medieval English judges' enjoyment of legal technicalities. Complica-
tions inevitably arise when a legal system allows any form of ownership of
property more sophisticated than absolute ownership by a single individu-
al. The Anglo-American common law has dealt with the problems of future
and successive interests in land by its doctrine of estates or, as Maitland
called it, the "wonderful calculus of estates." However wonderful it is, our
inheritance has not been trouble-free.
This article will examine a possible line of solution to some of the
problems which arise where the ownership of land is split between differ-
ent persons. It will be suggested that some assistance may be gained
towards the solution of these problems by an examination of the principles
of the English property legislation of 1925.' In England whether the
ownership of land is split between different persons by the creation of
successive future interests, or by present concurrent interests, the title to
every piece of land, however complicated the beneficial interests, can be
conveyed immediately, either by a single person or by a group of trustees.
All future freehold interests exist in equity only, and all the technicalities
relating to legal future interests disappear at a stroke.
I. LIMITED INTERESTS IN LAND
In an early state of development of a legal system nothing more than
* Professor of Law, King's College, University of London. LL.B., 1939,
Birmingham; M.A., B.C.L., 1947, Oxford University; S.J.D., 1959, Harvard Un-
iversity.
1. See Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its American Aspects, 37 YALE L.J.
179 (1927); Schnebly, "Legal" and "Equitable" Interests in Land under the English
Legislation, 40 HARV. L. REv. 248 (1926); Crane, The Law of Real Property in
England and The United States: Soie Comparisons, 36 IND. L.J. 282, 297 (1961);
Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests, 1972
DUKE L.J. 517.
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absolute ownership by one person is permitted. As development continues,
ownership of property by various persons in succession or by a number of
persons concurrently is allowed. The method in which this is accomplished
varies, of course, both between and within each system depending upon
the nature of the property. For example, in the case of ownership of an ice
cream cone, a simple system of absolute ownership is all that is needed
because the property is short-lived and not suitable for sharing. Although
disputes as to the ownership may arise, the problems met in solving these
disputes are simple in comparison with those which arise in connection
with the conflicts of various interests existing in an advanced legal system.
Successive and concurrent interests first developed in connection with
land. An efficient system of land ownership was essential to the social,
governmental, and military structure of a feudal state, and aristocratic
landowners sought to develop ways of perpetuating the privileged position
of their families. By comparison, movable property, consisting in those
days mainly of money and chattels, was of less significance. As a result,
personal property did not acquire a "permanent" form until the develop-
ment of corporations allowed the investment of funds in corporate stock to
be regarded as the basic form of family capital.
In the case of both personal property and real property it is necessary
not merely to determine questions of ownership but to establish a system
which, will allow a complex series of beneficial interests to be created in
various beneficiaries. Such a situation arises not only where there is a grand
family trust containing millions of dollars, but also where there is merely a
gift by will to a widow for life with remainder to the children. In both cases
the principle is the same. A legal system should provide the means by which
a settlor or testator can create a series of beneficial interests, even though
the creation of these interests may complicate the method of dealing with
the property.
In modern trusts of personalty the creation of such beneficial interests
is usually not a problem. Legal title to the stock is vested in the trustees who
can sell it and buy other stocks. The beneficial interests do not clog the title.
It is a problem in the case of common law estates because in these estates
the legal ownership is split. For example, if one desires to purchase land
given to a widow for life remainder to the children, should the purchaser
buy it from the widow, the children, or from both? Various answers are
possible; and different legal systems give different answers. If one looks at
the matter from the point of view of the civil law systems, which allow one
person to have the dominium or ownership of land, then that person is the
person who should make the sale. The widow in such a case will be a
usufructuary, and the question arises whether a purchaser from the owner
takes free from, or subject to the widow's interest. If one looks at the matter
from the point of view of the common law system, the question is answered
quite differently. The doctrine of estates provides that individuals do not
theoretically own the land. Instead they own only an estate in the land. The
[Vol. 42
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greatest of these estates is the fee simple. If the enjoyment of the land is
split among persons successively, each successive owner is entitled to an
estate in the land smaller than the fee simple. In all cases, however, the
estates add up precisely to one fee simple. Thus, if the limitation is to the
widow for life, remainder to X in fee simple, the widow is the owner of a
life estate in possession, and X is the owner of a fee simple estate in
remainder. Added together, these estates equal one fee simple in posses-
sion.
The more complex the series of successive interests, the more complex
the number of estates which are required to exist. For convenience of
conveyancing, a system is needed in which the purchaser can buy the land
without buying separately each beneficiary's estate. If the purchaser has to
buy the interests of each beneficiary, the land may become unmarketable,
either because it is impossible for a purchaser to negotiate separately with
each beneficiary or because the beneficiary is unascertainable, a minor, or
not yet born.
One possible way of meeting these problems is to vest the legal estate in
trustees upon trust for the beneficiaries, as is done in the case of a trust of
personalty, so as to give the beneficiaries an equitable estate instead of a
legal estate. This allows the trustees, on sale, to transfer the legal estate to
the purchaser. The difficulty with this situation is that in a trust of land, the
purchaser would have notice of the beneficial interests and would take
subject to them. This could be overcome by express provision in the trust
instrument to the effect that the purchaser should take free from the
interests of the beneficiaries and that a receipt given by the trustees would
be a complete discharge to the purchaser. 2 However, it is clear from
reading the cases that this is not always done, and, even if it were, provision
should be made by some statute to protect the purchaser; otherwise he
takes at his own risk because the trust provision may be insufficient to
protect him. Any doubt on this question may render the land unmarket-
able.
In summary, it is in the interests of the conveyancing system generally
that provision should be made by statute to the effect that the purchaser
shall be protected when buying land in which there are successive or
concurrent interests. Whenever the land is owned by a person other than
an absolute fee simple owner, the interests of the beneficiaries must be
equitable, and the person in whom the fee simple estate is vested should
have the power to sell the land and to transfer to a purchaser a legal estate
which is unaffected by the equitable beneficial interests. The beneficial
interests are transferred from the land to the purchase money. This results
in a legal estate that always is alienable. However, this policy also is contrary
2. As Leach said in 1940, "Most future interests are now created by way of
trust with powers of sale and lease in the trustees ample to insure full use of the
property." W. LEACH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
802 (2d ed. 1940).
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to much American legislation of the 19th century, which statutorily restrict-
ed the occasions on which trusts of land could be created.3
II. FUTURE INTERESTS
The creation of successive interests necessarily involves the creation of
future interests of one sort or another. This results in a number of diffi-
culties. Some of these problems, such as constructional problems, the
application of the perpetuity rule, the Rule in Shelley's Case, and the
doctrine of worthier title, affect equitable as well as legal future interests.
Others, such as the liability of contingent remainders to destruction by
failure to vest or by tortious feoffment, affect legal future interests only.
The proper treatment of these problems is a separate topic. The point here
is that if future interests were equitable, the legal future interest problems
would disappear. More importantly, if the legal estate owner were given
the power to convey and "overreach '4 the equitable interests, then any
problems relating to such interests would not affect the validity of the
trustees' title. As a result, the land would remain marketable.
Consider Professor Fratcher's illustration of this principle.5 A family
owns a piece of land which is needed for development. An offer of
$2,000,000 is made conditioned upon title being made marketable within
six months. The title to the land is complicated by two parts of the land
being subject to possibilities of reverters. One is subject to a right of entry
on breach of a condition subsequent, and the other is subject to a contin-
gent remainder and to an executory interest. Because none of these con-
tingencies can be determined within six months, the land is unsaleable. If
all these interests were equitable and the legal estate owner had over-
reaching powers on a sale, the title would be marketable even though there
might be litigation over the proceeds of sale. This is the result achieved by
the English legislation. It "preserves the freedom to create future interests
but deprives them of their former effect of restraining the use and transfer
of land in the manner must beneficial to its owners and the community."
6
III. THE ENGLISH LEGISLATION OF 1925
On January 1, 1926, a number of property statutes came into force in
England. The most important of these are: the Settled Land Act 1925, the
3. See N.Y. REAL. PROP. LAW §§ 91-99 (McKinney 1968) (§ 96 amended 1965)
(§§ 91-96, 98 repealed 1967; §§ 97, 99 repealed 1965); 1 A. ScOTT, THE LAW ON
TRUSTS § 59.1 (1939).
4. To "overreach" is to transfer, on a sale, the equitable beneficial interests
from the land to the purchase money. The owner retains his interest; he has exactly
the same interest in the purchase money as he previously had in the land. See text
accompanying note 9, infra; Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.20, § 2(1),
at 565 (1925); Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 75, at 456 (1925).
5. Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests,
1972 DUKE L.J. 517.
6. Id. at 549.
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Trustee Act 1925, the Law of Property Act 1925, and the Land Registra-
tion Act 1925. This legislation basically follows the principles discussed
above. Much additional detail is included in the legislation which is not
relevant here, but it is worth looking at some of the most significant of the
provisions to see how they establish the principles of the system.
A. The Law of Property Act 1925
The Law of Property Act 1925 provides that the only estates in land
which are capable of subsisting or of being conveyed or created at law are:
(a) an estate in fee simple absolute in possession,
(b) a term of years absolute ...(3) all other estates, interests, and
charges in or over the land take effect as equitable interests. 7
Thus, the only freehold estate which can exist as a legal estate is a fee
simple absolute in possession.8 Each lesser estate, such as a fee simple in
remainder, a life interest in possession or in remainder, an executory
interest, a possibility of reverter, or a power of termination, can exist in
equity only.
Although future interests in land are all equitable, and the legal estate
is in trustees, it is still necessary to provide that, on a sale of the land by the
trustees, the purchaser takes the fee simple free from the interests of the
beneficiaries. One must, however, also provide for the protection of the
interests of the beneficiaries. This would seem to create a dilemma, as the
interests of the purchaser and of the beneficiaries appear to be diametrical-
ly opposed. The English solution to this question is the doctrine called
"overreaching." This doctrine states that when land held by trustees upon
trust for the holders of future equitable interests is sold, the legal estate
passes to the purchaser free of the beneficial interests. In return, the
purchase money, if paid to nominated trustees, is held by them upon the
same trusts as the land was originally held. Thus, the purchaser gets the
land free from the beneficial interests. The beneficiaries lose their interests
in the land, but instead they receive precisely the same interest in a sum of
money that is equivalent to the value of the land. A sale of land held subject
to trusts in these circumstances is regarded not as a question of competition
7. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 1(1), at 563-64 (1925).
8. There is an exception in the case of "a fee simple subject to a legal or
equitable right of entry or re-entry" which is for the purposes of the Act a fee
simple absolute. These words were added to the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16
Geo. 5, c. 20, § 7, at 570 (1925) by the Law of Property (Amendment) Act, 1926, 16
& 17 Geo. 5, c. 11, Sched. at 61 (1926). The intention of the Legislature appears to
have been to include as legal estates certain holdings, common in the North of
England, where a fee simple is purchased in return for a perpetual rent charge on
the land. But the enactment is, in its terms, wider than this and appears to include a
grant to A in fee simple subject to a right of entry in the grantor on the happening
of some event. One would have expected a fee simple subject to such a condition to
have been an equitable interest, and for such a grant to have created a settlement.
Indeed, the Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18, § I(1)(ii)(b), at 394 (1925)
would appear to include it.
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between the interests of the purchaser and the beneficiaries, but as a
situation in which the purchaser gets the land free from the beneficial
interests, and the trustees are regarded as having changed the nature of
the investment of that amount of family capital. The balance of the inter-
ests of life tenant and remaindermen remain the same. Whether or not the
change works out to be profitable is a matter which depends upon the
success of the different forms of investment.
The doctrine of overreaching is set out in broad terms of Law of
Property Act 1925. The Act provides that a conveyance to a purchaser of a
legal estate in land shall overreach any equitable interest or power affecting
that estate whether or not the holder of the equitable interest has notice of
it, if the conveyance is made in one of various ways. 9 The most significant
means by which the conveyance may be made are a conveyance under
powers conferred by the Settled Land Act 1925 and a conveyance made by
trustees for sale. These situations will be examined in more detail below.
The principle which is emerging from this examination of the English
legislation is one in which ownership of land is enjoyed essentially in one of
three ways: as an owner of a fee simple absolute in possession, as a tenant
for life of a settlement of land which is governed by the Settled Land Act,
or as trustees holding the land on trust for sale. These are three different
and exclusive ways of holding land, and almost all land is held in one of
these ways.
B. The Settled Land Act 1925
The Settled Land Act 192510 is the latest of a number of statutes which
have modernized ways of dealing with the problem of successive interests
in land. Traditionally, landed English families set up what the English call a
"strict settlement" of land. This was a series of successive interests in land,
designed to keep the land in the family for the longest possible period. The
perpetuity period was of course the limit; but by means of a resettlement
once a generation, it was possibleoto keep the land in the family indefinitely,
and there are families who can show a continuous occupation of land back
to medieval times. Since all future interests in land now are required to be
equitable, a strict settlement is a trust of land. However, the name "settle-
ment" continues, and it is commonly used in England to denote trusts of
personalty as well.
It is no longer common to create elaborate settlements in the old style.
Under the English tax system, capital transfer tax is payable upon the
principal value of a trust upon the death of a life tenant.11 Therefore, a
long series of successive interests is obviously unsatisfactory. Other
methods are not employed and there has been much activity in England in
9. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 2(1), at 565 (1925),
10. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18 (1925).
11. Finance Act, 1975, c.7; See Maudsley, The British Capital Transfer Tax, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 778 (1976).
(Vol. 42
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terminating family trusts for tax reasons.12 Nevertheless, successive inter-
ests in land are still found. One most commonly sees such interests in the
case of a modest family home which has been given by will to a widow for
her life and after her death to the children; but one also finds successive
interests which have survived from old family settlements.
The Settled Land Act 1925 provides that where land is held in trust for
persons by way of succession, the legal estate must be vested in one per-
son.'3 The person selected is the person entitled to possession, that is to say,
the tenant for life.' 4 He holds the legal estate upon trust for himself for life
and then for the remaindermen. He is given various powers of dealing with
the land such as leasing and mortgaging, and he is also given the all-impor-
tant power of sale.' 5 Thus the life tenant is given the fee simple as trustee. 16
If he sells the fee, the purchaser takes free of the beneficial interests. These
interests leave the land and attach themselves to the purchase money. It
would not be safe to allow the purchaser to pay the capital money to the life
tenant as trustee because he might spend it. Therefore, the Act provides
that all capital money arising in respect of dealings with settled land shall be
paid to other trustees who are nominated in the document, and they hold
the purchase money upon the trusts of the settlement.17
The Settled Land Act 1925 provides a definition of settled land. The
Act states that any instrument whereby land stands for the time being
"limited in trust for any persons by way of succession" is a settlement. 8 A
settlement is also created where land is held by "an infant, for an estate in
fee simple or for a term of years absolute." 19 The reason why land held by a
minor in fee simple is included in the definition is that it would otherwise
be impossible to deal with such land. The minor is neither a tenant for life
nor does he hold the legal estate or exercise the statutory powers. Instead,
special provision is made for the trustees of the settlement to exercise the
powers of the tenant for life during the infant's minority.20
Under the Act, the tenant for life is basically "the person of full age
who is for the time being beneficially entitled under a settlement to posses-
sion of the settled land for his life."2' He is given certain powers in relation
to the settled land and is allowed to execute a deed of conveyance which is
effective to pass the land conveyed free and discharged from all the
limitations and powers and provisions of the settlement (with various
exceptions).22 In return the money received for the sale of the land is held
12. Variation of Trusts Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 53, at 503 (1958).
13. Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 4(2), at 396 (1925).
14. Id. §§ 19, 20.
15. Id. § 38.
16. Id. § 107.
17., Id. §§ 18(2), 94.
18. Id. § 1(1), (5).
19. Id. § l(1)(ii)(d).
20. Id. § 26.
21. Id. § 19.
22. Id. § 72.
1977]
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on the same trusts as the land was held. 23 Where there is no one who
qualifies as a tenant for life, his powers are given to other persons, usually
the trustees of the settlement. 24 Provision also is made in the Act for the
appointment of trustees2 5 and for the purchaser to know who they will be.
26
C. Trusts for Sale
The standard form of a trust for sale is where property is vested in
trustees upon trust to sell whereby the trustees hold the rents and profits
until sale and hold the proceeds of sale on trust for the beneficiaries in
succession or concurrently. The trustees are given the same powers of
dealing with land as a tenant for life under a settlement 27 and have a
discretionary power to postpone sale indefinitely.28 Overreaching is pro-
vided for by law.2 9 However, it would seem that, in the case of a trust for
sale, it would so operate without express provision.30 This conclusion
results because of the doctrine of conversion which requires a court of
equity to treat as done that which ought to be done. Thus, by virtue of this
doctrine the beneficial interests under the trust for sale are automatically
considered to be interests in personalty in the proceeds of sale.
Since 1925, a settlor who desires to create a series of successive inter-
ests, whether life interests, entails, or fee simple remainders, has been able
to do so either by creating a settlement of interests in realty or by creating a
similar settlement, behind a trust for sale, of interests in personalty.3' If a
settlor wishes to create concurrent interests, however, he only can do so
behind a trust for sale. The settlement and the trust for sale can be
regarded as different methods of achieving in effect the same result. An
amendment to the Settled Land Act3 2 makes the definition of a settlement
applicable only to the case where land is not held upon trust for sale. Why
23. Id. § 75(5).
24. Id. § 23.
25. Id. § 30.
26. Id. § 5(1)(c).
27. Id. § 29.
28. Id. § 25.
29. Id. § 2.
30. It was originally the rule in equity that a purchaser held the land
subject to a claim in favor of the cestui until proper application of the
purchase money had been made, or the receipt of the cestui procured,
except in cases where the trust instrument provided expressly or by
implication of fact that the receipt of the trustee alone should suffice. But
now by statute in England and in many of the United States U. PERRY,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (6th ed. 1911) n. 58, at 1303] the receipt of the
trustee alone is sufficient in all cases where he sells under the power of the
trust.
Comment, 40 HARV. L. REV. 248, 262 (1926).
31. Entails in personalty were permitted by the Law of Property Act, 1925, 15
& 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 130(2), at 660 (1925).
32. Law of Property (Amendment) Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c.l 1 (1926)
amending Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 1, at 394 (1925).
(Vol. 42
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the 1925 legislation provided two alternative and exclusive ways of achiev-
ing a similar result is a difficult question. The most likely answer is that,
while the trust for sale was the most favored system, the settlement, being
the traditional method of landholding among the nation's leading families,
was politically difficult to discard. A single method would have been much
better.
D. Statutory Trusts for Sale
We began by saying that some of the complications in this field arose
from the fact that interests in favor of a number of persons could be
created in the same piece of land. In the context of the strict settlement,
this was illustrated by the case of successive interests in land. In the case of
trusts for sale, it was pointed out that this might arise where the interests
were successive or concurrent. We now need to deal with the situation in
which concurrent interests arise, but are not expressly placed behind a
trust for sale. In that situation the Law of Property Act provides that the
concurrent interests shall be held behind a trust for sale.3
3
The most important forms of co-ownership with which we are con-
cerned are the familiar forms of joint tenancy and tenancy in common.3 4
Joint tenancy creates no significant conveyancing problems because there is
only one title among the joint tenants. The only practical difficulty is that
where there are a very large number of joint tenants, a purchaser may have
difficulty in negotiating with each of them. Tenancy in common, however,
gives rise not only to this problem, but also to more serious conveyancing
problems as well. This is due to the fact that each tenant in common owns
an undivided share in the land and his interest will pass as part of his estate,
may be divided among a number of takers, or may be subjected to a
complicated series of beneficial interests. A joint tenancy, of course, may
become translated into a tenancy in common by severance, as by the
alienation of the interest of one of the joint tenants.
Law of Property Act 1925 provides that where land is expressly con-
veyed to any persons in undivided shares, then the land shall be held by
them or, if there are more than four of them, by the first four mentioned,
as trustees upon "statutory trusts. ' '35 Similarly, where a legal estate is
beneficially limited to persons as joint tenants, the land is to be held on
statutory trusts.3 6 Land help upon statutory trusts is held upon trust to sell
and to hold the net proceeds of the sale, and the net rents and profits until
sale, for the persons interested in the land. 7 For example, if land is
conveyed to A,BC,D, and E in undivided shares, the effect of that convey-
33. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, §§ 34-36, at 584-86
(1925).
34. Effectively, these are the only forms of co-ownership still existing in
England.
35. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 34(2), at 584 (1925).
36. Id. § 36.
37. Id. § 35.
1977]
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ance is to vest the legal estate in A,B, and D upon trust to sell and to hold
the proceeds of sale in trust for A,BCD, and E as tenants in common. The
beneficial interests are retained as originally intended and are placed
behind a trust for sale, the legal estate being held by not more than four
trustees. Instead of being interests in land, the beneficial interests are
personalty interests. Anyone who has had experience with the difficulties
involved in a partition suit or other suit involving concurrent interests will
appreciate how greatly a system of this sort simplifies the conveyancing of
such interests.
IV. CONVEYANCING SYSTEMS-REGISTRATION OF TITLE
A. Land Registration Act 1925
Most parts of England still operate under the ancient conveyancing
system under which the landowner retains the deeds to the property and
makes title by producing his deeds to the purchaser. 38 In this situation, it is
important to make the investigation of title as simple as possible. The 1925
property legislation certainly does that. Indeed, it is difficult for those
brought up in the law since 1925 to understand how a conveyancing system
coped with the complications which existed before that time. Many of the
matters which are discussed in American future interests courses are his-
torical anachronisms in England.
Because a system of conveyancing based on the making of title by the
production of deeds by the individual landowner is not a satisfactory
system, the Land Registration Act 1925 provides for an alternative proce-
dure. Under this procedure the title to land is registered under a state-run
Land Registry. This provides an official record of the title, and compensa-
tion is paid to anyone who suffers a loss by reason of a mistake.39 Thus,
in effect, title is guaranteed. Any purchaser can safely buy from the
registered owner of the land without making an examination of the appli-
cable deeds and documents. Because of practical difficulties which would
arise if the Act attempted to require the immediate registration of all
interests in land, registration is only required upon the first transfer of the
land following the Act's adoption.4" The Act makes the use of this proce-
dure optional. Very few sections of England elected to adopt it. However,
since the transfer of the responsibility of adopting the registration system
from local authorities to the central Government by the Land Registration
Act 1966,41 the use of the system has increased.
The Act divides all interests in land into three categories: interests
capable of registration, minor interests, and overriding interests. The old
categories of legal estates and equitable interests are abandoned. Interests
38. Crane, The Law of Real Property in England and the United States: Some
Comparisons, 36 IND. L.J. 282, 290 (1961).
39. Land Registration Act of 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 21, § 83.
40. Id. § 123.
41. Land Registration Act of 1966, c. 39.
(Vol. 42
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capable of registration are a legal fee simple, a long term of years, and the
interest of a legal mortgagee. The names of the holders of such interests
are registered as proprietors of these interests.
Minor interests are defined by exclusion. They comprise all interests in
land not being interests capable of registration and not being overriding
interests. Minor interests are those which require protection against pur-
chasers by being "entered on the register." The protection given depends
upon the nature of the interest and the method of notification. Interests
behind a settlement or trust for sale are included among the category of
minor interests,42 even though they will be overreached upon sale in the
case of registered land in the same manner as with undregistered land.
Overriding interests are a miscellaneous category of interests which
are binding on a purchaser even though no steps have been taken to enter
them on the register.43 This is a category of interests which do not fit a
system of registration. One example of an overriding interest is a legal
easement. Under the unregistered system, legal easements were legal inter-
ests and therefore binding. Under the registered system, they will not be
binding unless provision is made to that effect in the statute. It would not
be satisfactory to require these interests to be registered because in many
cases the dominant owner would not register them, and the status of those
which are in the course of being acquired by prescription is unknown.
Other interests which came within the category of overriding interests
include rights in the course of being acquired under the Limitation Act, the
proprietary rights of any person in actual occupation of the land, and the
obligation attaching to certain pieces of land to contribute to the mainte-
nance of the roof of the chancel of the village church.
B. Settlements and Trusts for Sale
As would be expected from what has been said of the 1925 legislation,
the tenant for life in the case of settled land and the trustees for sale in the
case of land held on trust for sale are the registered proprietors. 44 The
purchaser buys from them. The beneficial interests, even if they are en-
tered on the register as minor interests, are overreached on the sale in just
the same way as they were with unregistered land. One question arises
however: How does a purchaser distinguish between land owned benefi-
cially by a registered proprietor and land held by a registered proprietor as
tenant for life or as the survivor as trustees for sale? It is essential the
purchaser be able to make this distinction because in the case of beneficial
ownership he will pay the purchase money to the registered proprietor and
in the case of a settlement or trust for sale, he must pay capital money to at
least two trustees or to a trust corporation. The Act deals with this problem
by providing a "restriction." The restriction instructs the purchaser that
42. Land Registration Act of 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. § 21, § 3(xv).
43. Id. § 70.
44. Id. §§ 86, 94.
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"no disposition under which capital money arises is to be registered unless
the money is paid to [the trustees of the settlement or trust for sale] or into
court. ' 45 It is the duty of the tenant for life and the trustees in the case of a
trust for sale, to enter the restriction.46 If they fail to do so, any beneficiary
may protect himself by an appropriate entry on the register.47 Such an
entry informs the purchaser that there are trusts affecting the land and
that he should make inquiries as to the manner in which payment of the
purchase money should be made. If the proprietors do in fact enter the
restriction, nothing is gained by the entry on the register of the be-
neficiary's interest because they will be overreached.
V. A SINGLE SYSTEM-THE QUEENSLAND LEGISLATION
As previously stated, the present legislation provides two alternative
systems-the settlement and the trust for sale- by which what is effectively
the same objective may be achieved. It is essential to know under this dual
method which is applicable in a particular situation because if there is some
doubt as to which of the two procedures is applicable, the legal title to the
land will be in dispute.48 This problem would be avoided if there were only
a single system for land held for beneficiaries successively or concurrently.
Modern thinking has suggested that the whole matter would best be
treated by providing that all future and concurrent interests in land exist in
equity only, that the legal title to land subject to such interests be held by
trustees, that the trustees, by statute, be given all the necessary powers of
management and sale, and that a sale by the trustees have the effect of
overreaching the beneficial interests.49 This would replace the present
Settled Land Act legislation (which gives the powers to the tenant for life),
and the trustees would have complete powers of management, sale, and
overreaching without the necessity of the land being subjected to a trust for
sale. Such a system has been introduced in Queensland, Australia.
The Queensland Trusts Act 197350 applies to all property subject to a
trust "whether express, implied, resulting, bare or constructive ' '5 1 and gives
to the trustee all necessary powers of management which are retained
"whether or not a contrary intention is expressed in the instrument (if any)
45. Land Registration Rules of 1925, 15 Geo. 5, Statutory Forms 9, 62.
46. Id. form 104.
47. Land Registration Act of 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 21, §§ 56, 86.
48. In re Leigh's Settled Estates, [1926] Ch. 852; In re Parker's Settled Estates,
[1928] Ch. 247; In re Norton, [1929] 1 Ch. 84.
49. Grove, Conveyancing and the Property Acts of 1925, 24 MOD. L. REV. 123
(1961); Marshall, A Critique of the Property Legislation of Western Nigeria, I NIGERIAN
L.J. 151, 152 (1965); BELFAST QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF LAW LAND WORK-
ING PARTY, SURVEY OF THE LAND LAW OF NORTHERN IRELAND, para. 89 (1971);
Crane, The Law of Real Property in England and the United States: Some Comparisons,
36 IND. L.J. 282, 289 (1961).
50. Queensland Trust Act 1973, No. 24 (Australia).
51. Id. § 5.
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creating the trust. '52 Thus, the trustees have irrevocable statutory powers
and the "dead hand" of the settlor is not permitted to restrict the freedom
of dealing with the land in the interests of the living. Although a trust for
sale may be created expressly if desired, the settlement and the statutory
trust for sale are abolished.
VI. CONCLUSION
The acceptance in the United States of a system similar to the one
adopted in England would dispose of the most harmful effects of the
technicalities of common law estates, would greatly simplify dealing with
land held for successive or concurrent interests, and would eliminate the
evil effects of the legal technicalities of future interests. However, if legisla-
tion adopting such a system was made applicable to the existing interests, it
might be unconstitutional because it substitutes a legal estate for an equit-
able interest. This might constitute a depriviation of property without due
process of law.53 In England this was not a problem, for what Parliament
says is the law, and there is no basic constitutional rule which cannot be the
subject of ordinary legislation. Fratcher has suggested one solution to this
problem.5 4
There would be general agreement in England that the property
legislation of 1925 has been a great success, and the paucity of litigation on
the construction of the legislation has been remarkable. Whether reform
on these lines would be successful in the United States is difficult for an
outsider to judge. The problem to be remedied was much greater in
England. The retention of land by aristocratic families was a feature of
English social life up to modern times. Strict settlements were designed to
do this. But with the advent of the industrial revolution in the middle of the
18th century, it was in no one's interest for the land to be unavailable for
development because of its unmarketability. New tax legislation made strict
settlements even more unattractive. Because this was not a problem in the
United States many of the details of the English legislation would have no
relevance. Nevertheless, the principles would appear to be of value. Con-
veyancing problems arise where there are either successive or concurrent
interests in land. These problems exist without the social phenomen of the
English "landed gentry." As Bordwell said: "A strong argument could be
made for the abolition of the law of estates and the putting of partial
interests in trust. It would seem to be the only alternative to a modernized
law of estates. '55 And, it may be a much simpler solution.
52. Id. § 31(1).
53. Fratcher, A Modest Proposal for Trimming the Claws of Legal Future Interests,
1972 DUKE L.J. 517, 550.
54. Id.
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